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Bank Loan Loss Provisions, Investor Protection and the Macroeconomy 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the non-discretionary determinants of bank loan loss provisions in Africa after 
controlling for macroeconomic fluctuation, financial development and investor protection. We find 
that non-performing loans, loan-to-asset ratio and loan growth are significant non-discretionary 
drivers of bank provisions in the African region. We observe that bank provision is a positive function 
of non-performing loans up to a threshold beyond which bank provisions will no longer increase as 
non-performing loans increases. Also, bank loan-to-asset ratio is a significant driver of bank 
provisions when African banks have higher loan-to-asset ratios. Also, larger banks in financially 
developed African countries have fewer loan loss provisions while increase in bank lending leads to 
fewer bank provisions in countries with strong investor protection. Finally, higher bank lending is 
associated with higher bank provisions during economic boom. The findings have implications.  
JEL classification: C23, G21, G28, M41. 
Keywords: Loan Loss Provisions, Africa, Income Smoothing, Procyclicality, Economic Cycle, 
Investor Protection, Banks, Macroeconomy, Credit Risk, Financial Development.  
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the determinants of non-discretionary loan loss provisions among banks in 
Africa. Loan loss provision is an amount that banks set aside to mitigate expected loss on bank loan 
portfolio as part of their credit risk management function (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). The 
component of loan loss provisions that bank managers have control over is termed ‘discretionary’ 
loan loss provisions which they can use for income smoothing, capital management, signalling and 
tax management purposes (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Leventis et al, 2011; Ozili, 2015; Curcio and 
Hasan, 2015; Ozili, 2017; Andries et al, 2017), while the component of loan loss provisions that bank 
managers do not have control over is termed ‘non-discretionary’ loan loss provisions which is driven 
by fundamental credit risk and economic factors that affect banks’ loan portfolio and the survival and 
stability of banks in any country (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2012; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). In 
this study, we focus on non-discretionary loan loss provisions because it allows us to examine the 
credit risk and economic factors that influence bank provisioning decisions. 
From a global perspective, bank supervisors in developing countries place emphasis on non-
discretionary loan loss provisions because (i) it is an important micro prudential instrument for bank 
regulation while ‘general provision’1 is a core macro prudential instrument (Bikker and Metzemakers, 
2005; Pool et al, 2015), (ii) it is directly linked to the survival of banks that have a large loan portfolio 
because huge loan losses could have serious consequence for bank stability, and (iii) non-
discretionary provisions can be directly observed from bank financial statements compared to 
discretionary provisions (BCBS, 2004). 
In Africa, bank supervisors continue to raise serious concern about the under provisioning of banks 
relative to the rising non-performing loans in several African economies. For instance, the Central 
Bank of Kenya in 2015 require Kenyan banks to increase loan loss provisions by 2.4billion Kenya 
shillings. In 2010, the Central Bank of Nigeria issued a set of provisioning guidelines to ensure sound 
                                                          
1
 Basel II makes a distinction between specific provisions and general provisions (BCBS, 2004). Specific 
provision is set aside to cover actual loan losses that have materialised or that can be reasonably estimated while 
general provision is set aside to cover general credit risk in the business environment including loan losses that 
cannot be reasonably estimated (BCBS, 2004).  
4 
 
provisioning and disclosure practices among Nigerian banks (CBN, 2010)
2
. In the 2014 annual bank 
supervision report (p.22), the bank regulator in Uganda stress that the key source of vulnerability to 
the Ugandan banking sector is credit risk which could be mitigated via sufficient loan loss 
provisioning
3
.  
The growing concern of bank supervisors about insufficient bank provisioning begs the question of 
whether bank balance sheet characteristics can provide bank managers with a good indication of their 
true credit risk exposure for which they should keep adequate loan loss provisions that is 
commensurate with their credit risk exposure. Our curiosity therefore lead us to investigate the 
fundamental or non-discretionary factors that influence the level of bank provisions in order to gain 
some insight about the loan loss provisioning practices of banks in the region. 
Therefore, our paper is precisely an investigation into the non-discretionary determinants of bank loan 
loss provisions and how the determinants are influenced by transient macroeconomic changes and 
investor protection differences in the African region. We employ bank-level non-discretionary 
provisions determinants commonly used in the literature (see, De Lis et al, 2001; Pain, 2003; 
Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Ozili, 2017) and this approach is appropriate because the balance sheet 
characteristic of each bank reflect the unique conditions that each African bank face. We find that 
non-performing loans, loan-to-asset ratio and loan growth are important non-discretionary 
determinants of bank provisions in the African region. Further tests show that some determinants are 
strongly significant in environments with stronger investor protection, financial development and 
during periods of economic prosperity. 
Our analysis in this paper is of interest to bank supervisors in Africa for the following reasons. First, 
the assessment of the factors that drive the level of non-discretionary bank provisions is an important 
aspect of micro-prudential surveillance in many African countries; therefore, an in-depth 
understanding of the non-discretionary determinants of bank provisions in the region will help bank 
regulators and supervisors in the region to identify key vulnerabilities of banks in relation to credit 
                                                          
2
http://www.cenbank.org/out/2010/publications/bsd/prudential%20guidelines%2030%20june%202010%20final
%20%20_3_.pdf 
3
 https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bou-downloads/asr/2014/Dec/Annual-Supervision-Report-2014-.pdf 
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risk. Second, the findings in this paper can serve as a cross-check for bank supervisors in the region 
who wish to construct models that link bank loan loss provisions with the macro economy. More so, 
the analysis in this paper is also of interest to bank practitioners who are curious to identify balance 
sheet variables that influence the level of bank provisions in their bank. Finally, by focusing on the 
non-discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions, this study contributes to the literature that 
examine the discretionary provisions while controlling for non-discretionary provisions determinants. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of related literature 
Section 3 present the data. Second 4 discuss the methodology. Section 5 report the results. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Loan loss provision is a significant accrual
4
 in the banking industry (Lobo, 2017). Beaver and Engel 
(1996) demonstrate that the decisions that determine the level of non-discretionary provisions are 
based on variables that provide information about probable loan loss. They suggest that reported loan 
loss provision is conditional on the value relevance of information regarding its non-discretionary 
components. They further argue that a positive relation between loan loss provisions and its non-
discretionary determinants is expected if non-discretionary provision determinants convey value-
relevant information that determine the level of reported loan loss provisions. Conversely, they argue 
that a negative relation between reported provisions and its non-discretionary determinants may be 
expected if non-discretionary provisions determinants do not convey value-relevant information 
regarding the level of reported loan loss provisions (Beaver and Engel, 1996).  
Common non-discretionary determinants of bank loan loss provisions include loan growth (a proxy 
for bank lending or credit supply), non-performing loans (a proxy for realised credit risk), bank loan 
                                                          
4
 Accrual is the difference between profit and cashflow (Dechow and Dichev, 2002), where bank profit consist 
of two components: cash item (which is cashflow) and non-cash item (which is accrual). 
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to asset composition, total loan outstanding, bank size, etc. We discuss the literature that examine 
these determinants in the next section. 
2.1. Provisions and Bank Lending 
The relationship between loan loss provisions and bank lending (or loan growth) has been explored in 
the literature in several developed country studies while there is little knowledge on how bank lending 
influence the loan loss provisioning practices of banks in Africa. For instance, Foos et al (2010) 
investigate whether loan growth affects the riskiness of banks in 16 countries during the 1997 to 2007 
period and find that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss provisions during the subsequent 
three years, and has a negative impact on risk-adjusted interest income. They conclude that loan 
growth is an important driver of the riskiness of banks. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) in a cross-
country study investigate whether backward-looking provisioning amplifies growth in bank lending. 
They find that backward looking loan loss provisioning systems exacerbate lending fluctuations in 
emerging countries than in developed countries. Pool et al (2015) examine banks in 12 OECD 
countries and find that bank lending and loan loss provisions are drivers of business cycle 
fluctuations. They also observe that loan loss provisions decreases as bank lending increases. Mlachila 
and Sanya (2016) show that, after a crisis, a bank can reduce its risk-taking behaviour and 
subsequently engage in less bank lending leading to prolonged reduction in bank lending (financial 
intermediation). 
Given that loan growth is a proxy that reflects increase or decrease in bank lending, the literature 
present two views on the relationship between loan loss provisions and bank lending (or loan growth). 
Cavallo and Majnoni (2002), Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Hu (2002) present the 
‘cyclical’ view which argue that periods of economic prosperity leads to increase in bank lending, and 
banks are likely to underestimate credit risk during such periods by engaging in aggressive lending 
behaviour and lax loan screening standards. They argue that, when banks underestimate credit risk in 
periods of increased bank lending, they will keep fewer loan loss provisions. This view suggests a 
negative relationship between loan loss provisions and bank lending.  
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The second view is the counter-cyclical view (Borio et al, 2001; Lowe, 2002). Borio et al (2001) and 
Lowe (2002) argue that during periods of economic prosperity, banks that have forward-looking 
assessment of credit risk are more likely to anticipate credit risk that build-up during good economic 
times by keeping more provisions as a buffer against credit losses in anticipation of bad economic 
times. When economic downturns set in, banks can use the additional provisions buffer to cover for 
losses during bad economic periods. This view suggests a positive relationship between loan loss 
provisions and bank lending.  
To date, empirical studies report mixed evidence for the relationship between loan loss provisions and 
bank lending. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) report a significant and positive relation between bank 
provisions and loan growth for banks in OECD countries while the relation is positive but 
insignificant for European banks. Ozili (2017) find a positive relation between bank provisions and 
loan growth for Western European banks.  
2.2. Bank Provisions and Loan to Asset Composition. 
Loan-to-asset composition is the ratio of banks total loans to total assets, used to measure credit 
default risk of bank loan portfolio (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008). Banks with large amount of loan in 
their balance sheet will keep higher loan loss provisions to mitigate credit default risk and will keep 
fewer loan loss provisions if bank loans are well diversified across several assets. Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2008) show that higher (lower) loan to asset composition implies higher (lower) default risk, 
and banks with high default risk on the overall loan portfolio will keep more provisions to compensate 
for the riskiness of the loan portfolio. 
Empirical studies commonly include loan to asset ratio as a non-discretionary determinant of bank 
loan loss provisions. For example, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) investigate bank provisioning 
behaviour and find a positive relationship between bank provisions and loan to asset ratio. Bikker and 
Metzemakers (2005) examine bank provisioning in a wider cross-country context and find a positive 
relationship for banks in OECD countries but the relationship is not significant for European banks. 
Packer and Zhu (2012) investigate the loan loss provisioning practices of 240 banks in 12 Asian 
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economies during the 2000 to 2009 period and find evidence for countercyclical bank provisioning in 
the Asian region. They also document a positive relationship between bank provisions and loan to 
asset ratio for banks in South East Asia and a negative relationship for banks in China, India and 
Japan. Taken together, these studies suggest that the level of bank provisions is influenced by banks’ 
loan to asset composition. 
2.3. Bank Provisions and Economic Fluctuation 
The behaviour of bank provisions during bad economic times is claimed to exacerbate an existing 
recession in a country. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) argue that 
bank provisioning behaviour is cyclical because it reinforce the current state of the economy. Banks 
keep relatively higher loan loss provisions during bad economic times because problem loans are 
relatively higher during such periods, and keep fewer provisions during good economic times because 
banks have fewer problem loans during such periods, implying that economic fluctuation is an 
important driver of the level of bank loan loss provisions. 
Pain (2003) investigate the factors that explain the increase in the loan loss provisions of major UK 
banks and find that GDP growth, real interest rates and lagged aggregate lending growth are important 
predictors of the level of provisions of UK banks. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) find that non-
discretionary loan loss provisions are higher during bad economic times and lower during good 
economic times. Pool et al (2015) examine how credit risk affects bank lending and the business cycle 
for banks in 12 OECD countries and find that economic cycle fluctuations and bank lending are 
important drivers of loan loss provisions. Cummings and Durrani (2016) observe that Australian 
banks use discretionary provisions to mitigate the impact of fluctuations in lending activities in credit 
markets. Ozili (2015) find evidence to support the cyclical view showing a negative relationship 
between bank provisions and economic fluctuations among Nigerian banks. However, it is not clear 
whether the link between bank provisions and the economic fluctuation is procyclical or counter-
cyclical in the African region.  
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Furthermore, several emerging country studies focus on the relationship between the macroeconomy 
and foreign direct investment, exchange rate volatility, bank deposits and money supply (e.g. 
Mahembe and Odhiambo, 2016; Sehrawat and Giri, 2016; Akhtar et al, 2017, etc), but do not address 
the link between the macroeconomy and loan loss provisions in Africa. Our study control for 
economic fluctuation to detect the association between bank provisions (or non-discretionary 
provisions) and economic fluctuation. 
2.4. Bank Provisions and Bank Size 
The provisioning decisions of large banks may differ significantly from smaller banks due to political 
cost and scope of activity reasons. Firm size is commonly used to control for the political cost 
associated with larger firms because the activities and/or actions of large firms are more likely to 
attract political/regulatory scrutiny compared to the activities of smaller firms. With regard to activity 
level, Anandarajan et al (2003) argue that large banks have higher levels of business activities 
compared to smaller banks and will keep more provisions to compensate for their increased level of 
business activities, implying a positive relationship between bank size and bank provisions.  
Several studies that control for the impact of bank size on bank provisions document conflicting 
results, for instance, Bushman and William (2012) and Leventis et al (2011) report a negative 
relationship between bank size and loan loss provisions in their cross-country study. Anandarajan et al 
(2007) control for bank size in their study while investigating income smoothing, capital management 
and signalling among Australian banks. They find a positive but insignificant relation for bank size. 
Similarly, Quttainah et al (2013) control for bank size while investigating the use of loan loss 
provisions to manage earnings among Islamic banks and find a positive relationship between bank 
size and bank provisions. 
2.5. Investor Protection 
Institutional factors such as investor protection can provide additional monitoring on bank managers 
provisioning discretion to ensure that bank managers’ provisioning decisions reflect the true credit 
risk of banks rather than opportunistic objectives (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Curcio and Hasan, 
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2015). Olszak et al (2016) examine the relationship between provisions and the business cycle and the 
source of such relationship among EU banks, and find that the provisions of listed banks are more 
procyclical. Also, they observe that stronger investor protection is associated with reduced 
procyclicality of bank provisions.  
In this paper, we argue that banks in environments with strong investor protection have some 
incentive to report fewer provisions because reporting high provisions could significantly lower bank 
earnings and reduce value to shareholders. When there is active monitoring, strong investor protection 
should compel bank managers to find ways to exercise some control over the non-discretionary 
determinants of bank provisions to avoid reporting excessive loan loss provisions that would 
significantly lower earnings and reduce value to shareholders (and to minority shareholders), 
therefore, one would expect that bank provisions should not be too high in countries that have strong 
investor protection. 
 
3. Data 
The sample consist of banking institutions that report data for loan loss provisions during the 2004 to 
2013 period from 19 African countries. Bank income statement and balance sheet data are collected 
from Bankscope database while data for real gross domestic product (ΔGDP) growth rate and investor 
protection are collected from World Economic Forum and Doing Business indicators archived in the 
World Bank database. Using the GDP growth variable, we measure a recessionary period as the 
year(s) when a country has a negative real GDP growth rate, reflecting periods when a country 
experience economic downturn while we measure economic boom as the year(s) when a country has 
above-the-median real GDP growth rate, reflecting periods when a country experience economic 
growth or economic prosperity. The description of data source is provided in Appendix A2.  
To be included in the sample, the bank must be domiciled in an African country. Also, to minimise 
survivorship bias, we did not restrict the sample to banks that had full reporting data for the full 
period, hence, banks with reporting data for at least 4 consecutive years from 19 countries were 
11 
 
included, yielding an unbalanced panel consisting of a final sample of 302 banks. The bank-level 
observations were trimmed to eliminate outliers at the top and bottom at 99% and 1%, respectively. 
Also, we did not exclude 2008 bank-year observations in our data because we did not have a reason to 
believe that the balance sheet of African banks was significantly affected by the 2008 global financial 
crisis. African banks were not systemically integrated with the global financial system at that time, 
hence, the global financial crisis should not have had a significant effect on the balance sheet of 
African banks. 
 
4. Methodology 
The baseline model to estimate the non-discretionary determinants of bank loan loss provisions 
estimate loan loss provisions as a function of its non-discretionary determinants and are similar to the 
model adopted by Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008, 2012), Bushman and William (2012), Leventis et al 
(2011) and Ozili (2017). We use loan loss provisions as the dependent variable while the explanatory 
variables are the non-discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions.  
The multivariate model is given as:  
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 1 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 
+  𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡. … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1 
Where i = bank, t = year, j = country. LLP is the dependent variable measured as the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to total assets for firm i at year t. NPL is non-performing loans to gross loan for firm i at 
year t. lnLOAN captures bank lending measured as the natural logarithm of loan growth (or change in 
gross loan outstanding) for firm i at year t. LOTA is net loan to total asset ratio for firm i at year t. TA 
captures bank size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i at year t. lnΔGDP is the 
natural logarithm of real gross domestic product growth rate reflecting economic cycle fluctuation.  
Consistent with Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), we introduce the lagged dependent variable to 
control for banks’ dynamic adjustment to loan loss provisions in anticipation of expected loss on bank 
12 
 
loan portfolio. Non-performing loans (NPL) control for ‘specific provisions’, that is, provisions that 
banks set aside for actual loan losses (Beaver and Engel, 1996); hence, we expect a positive sign for 
β2 coefficient. lnLOAN variable controls for the impact of bank lending (or credit supply) on bank 
loan loss provisions, and we do not have a definite prediction for β3 coefficient. We take the natural 
logarithm of LOAN to capture only the non-negative values of loan growth indicating actual bank 
lending or increase in credit supply. In further test, we use the non-logarithmic value of LOAN 
variable. Loan to asset ratio (LOTA) captures credit default risk associated with bank loan portfolio. 
Banks that have excessive loan relative to its asset will face higher credit default risk and will keep 
higher loan loss provisions to mitigate such credit default risk concern (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008); 
therefore, we expect a positive sign for β4 coefficient. TA controls for the impact of bank size on 
bank provisioning behaviour and we predict a positive sign for β5 coefficient because larger banks 
have increased level of business activities and should keep higher loan loss provisions to compensate 
for their increased level of business activities including increased lending activities (Anandarajan et 
al, 2003). InΔGDP is measured as the natural logarithm of GDP growth rate (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 
2008), and controls for the behaviour of bank provisioning during periods of economic prosperity. 
Consistent with the argument of Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Beatty and Liao (2009), we expect 
banks to keep fewer provisions during good economic times because credit risk is lower during such 
periods; therefore, a negative relationship between LLP and InΔGDP is expected. 
We undertake further tests to determine whether loan loss provisions are influenced by low and high 
values of each non-discretionary determinant of bank provisions. We introduce ‘NPLD’ variable that 
equal one if NPL ratio is a double-digit number and zero otherwise, representing periods when banks 
have significant problem loans. ‘LG’ variable equal one if loan growth (LOAN) is positive and zero 
when loan growth is negative, representing periods when banks experience increase and decrease 
lending, respectively. ‘LT’ variable equal one if loan-to-asset ratio (LOTA) is at least 60% and zero 
otherwise, representing periods when banks face high credit default risk on their loan portfolio. ‘BG’ 
variable equal one if total asset is above-the-median natural logarithm of total asset and zero 
otherwise. ‘REC’ variable equal one if ΔGDP is negative and zero otherwise, representing periods of 
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economic downturns or recessions. ‘BOOM’ variable equal one if ΔGDP is above-the-median ΔGDP 
growth rate and zero otherwise, representing periods of economic growth or economic prosperity. 
Finally, the dummies are interacted with the associated main variable to test for any transient effect of 
the determinants on the level of bank provisions. The model is re-specified in Equation 2 as: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 1 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 
+  𝛽7𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐷𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐿𝐺𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐿𝐺𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐿𝑇𝑡 
+  𝛽12𝐿𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13𝐵𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽14 𝐵𝐺𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽15𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡 +  𝛽16𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡
∗ ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽17𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑡 +  𝛽18𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 … … … 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2 
In the third round of tests, we test whether the level of investor protection has a significant impact on 
each non-discretionary determinant of bank provisions. Strong investor protection should compel 
bank managers to find ways to exercise some control over the non-discretionary determinants of bank 
provisions to avoid reporting excessive loan loss provisions that would significantly lower earnings 
and reduce value to shareholders (and to minority shareholders), therefore, we expect that bank 
provisions should not be too high in African countries that have strong investor protection institutions. 
The investor protection variable employed is the ‘strength of investor protection’ index (INVPRO). 
The ‘strength of investor protection’ index (INVPRO) measures the strength of minority shareholder 
protection against the misuse of corporate assets by directors for personal gain. The index is 
developed based on the methodology of La Porta and others (see. Djankov et al, 2008). INVPRO 
index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating stronger minority shareholders rights 
protection. 
The model is re-specified in Equation 3 below: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 1 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 
+  𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 
+  𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 
+  𝑒𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 3 
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As the model considers a dynamic adjustment of LLP, the models are estimated with the fixed effect 
OLS and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The GMM estimation is performed 
using first difference (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and orthogonal deviation (Arellano and Bover, 
1995). The GMM estimations are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. For the fixed effect 
OLS regression, we include the lagged dependent variable to correct for possible serial correlation 
between the explanatory variables and the error term. These two estimation techniques (OLS and 
GMM) allow us to test the robustness of the main findings reported in Table 2. Robust standard error 
correction is also applied to the coefficients of the t-statistics in the fixed effect regression to correct 
for possible unobservable heteroscedasticity issues. Also, the correlation between the variables in 
Appendix A1 are sufficiently low to be concerned about multicollinearity in our analyses. Finally, the 
presence of multiple binary variables require the use of separate regression models to test the 
interaction effects in the next section. 
 
5. Empirical Result 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1a&b report the descriptive statistics. In table 1b, LLPs on average are 0.9% of total assets 
while LLPs are higher for banks in Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia and Angola, and lower for banks in 
Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius and Uganda, implying that there are substantial differences in the level 
of bank provisions across African countries. NPLs, on average, are 7.89% of gross loan and is double-
digit higher for banks in Egypt (14.07%) and Tunisia (15.01%). The high NPLs suggest that banks in 
North Africa (Egypt and Tunisia) have lower credit quality possibly due to poor credit risk 
management practices. Comparatively, NPLs are lower for banks in Namibia and Uganda. Loan 
growth (LOAN) is about 19.2% but exhibit substantial differences across African countries. For 
instance, LOANs are much lower for banks in Egypt while other African countries experience a 
double-digit increase in loan growth over the sample period and are relatively higher for banks in 
Ghana and Angola. With respect to bank size, total asset (TA) on average is 13.45 and is higher for 
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banks in Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, and lower for banks in Namibia and 
Uganda, implying that the average bank size in several African countries vary substantially. ΔGDP on 
average is about 5.7% and is lower for banks in South Africa and Algeria and higher for banks in 
Ethiopia, Angola and Nigeria, implying that some African countries experience greater economic 
stability than others during the period of analysis. Overall, the conclusion from the descriptive 
statistics suggests that there are wide bank-level variations across banks in the African countries 
examined. 
Table 1a: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 LLP lnLOAN NPL TA LOTA ln∆GDP 
Mean 0.009 2.84 7.89 13.45 52.14 1.60 
Median 0.005 2.97 1.64 13.22 52.07 1.64 
S.D 0.019 1.04 0.61 1.91 20.31 0.61 
Minimum -0.305 -3.50 0.00 5.00 10.05 -1.46 
Maximum 0.222 8.72 23.00 19.12 98.46 0.61 
Observation 2438 1952  2575 2555 2965 
*S.D - Standard Deviation. Descriptive statistics based on 302 sample banks from 19 countries. Data cover the period 2004 to 
2013. LLP = loan loss provision to total asset ratio for firm i at year t. lnLOAN = natural logarithm of change in gross loan 
outstanding. LOTA = net loan to total asset ratio for firm i at time t. NPL = ratio of non-performing loan to gross loan for firm 
i at year t. TA = natural logarithm of total asset for firm i at year t. InΔGDP = natural logarithm of real gross domestic product 
growth rate. 
 
Table 1b: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Country Mean 
 LLP 
Mean 
LOAN 
Mean  
TA 
Mean  
LOTA 
Mean 
INVPRO 
Mean 
ΔGDP 
Mean 
NPL 
# Banks 
Algeria 0.003 19.38 14.17 40.95 5 3.14 5.75 16 
Angola 0.008 33.35 13.85 30.76 5.3 10.79 5.73 14 
Botswana 0.002 22.54 12.88 56.69 5.4 7.60 9.26 12 
Cameroun 0.004 12.24 12.90 49.80 4.3 3.49 8.15 11 
Egypt 0.006 9.45 14.91 39.20 3.6 4.52 14.07 16 
Ethiopia 0.004 25.69 13.09 46.86 3.3 11.01 7.00 12 
Ghana 0.003 31.04 13.12 43.38 6.3 7.43 10.20 15 
Kenya 0.0003 22.59 12.47 52.59 5 5.24 10.18 24 
Mauritius 0.002 12.39 13.50 53.01 7.7 3.98 4.18 15 
Morocco 0.003 11.27 15.50 60.04 3.4 4.43 5.18 18 
Namibia 0.002 14.50 13.74 74.17 5.3 5.28 2.99 10 
Nigeria 0.010 20.07 15.56 39.25 5.7 8.78 4.92 16 
Senegal 0.006 15.48 12.70 60.86 3 3.83 7.31 10 
South Africa 0.004 16.95 14.89 62.17 8 3.28 7.75 29 
Tanzania 0.007 26.44 12.21 50.06 4.9 6.67 4.06 16 
Togo 0.008 23.64 12.41 54.68 3.7 3.53 10.91 7 
Tunisia 0.008 12.66 13.26 30.18 4.8 4.05 15.10 26 
Uganda 0.002 21.45 11.99 47.99 4.7 7.07 3.71 21 
Zambia 0.006 28.97 11.79 37.60 5.3 7.76 9.14 14 
Total        302 
         
Mean 0.009 19.21 13.45 52.14 5.18 5.74 4.80  
Median 0.005 15.75 13.22 52.07 5.00 5.17 5.00  
S.D 0.019 23.74 1.91 20.31 1.46 3.91 8.00  
Maximum 0.222 98.57 19.12 98.46 8.00 33.73 1.00  
Minimum -0.305 -81.60 5.00 20.21 2.70 -1.53 2.29  
Observations 2438 2319 2575 2555 2718 3020 2718  
*S.D - Standard Deviation. Descriptive statistics based on 302 sample banks from 19 countries. Data cover the period 2004 to 
2013. LLP = loan loss provision. NPL = ratio of non-performing loans to gross loan. LOTA = net loan to total asset ratio.  
LOAN = change in gross loan outstanding. INVPRO = protection of minority shareholder right. ΔGDP = real gross domestic 
product growth rate. TA = natural logarithm of total asset. 
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5.2. Regression Result 
The estimated coefficient of NPL is positive and significant at 1% level and implies that non-
performing loan is a significant non-discretionary determinant of loan loss provisions among African 
banks and this result is robust to alternative econometric estimation. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) and Ozili (2017) for European banks. LOTA coefficient is 
positive and significant in all estimation indicating that bank provisioning in Africa is significantly 
influenced by credit default risk on bank loan portfolio. This finding is consistent with the findings of 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) and imply that African bank 
managers keep higher loan loss provisions when they have high loan to asset ratio in their loan 
portfolio. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positively significant at 1% level in all 
estimations, implying that an increase (decrease) in bank provisions in the previous period is followed 
increase (decrease) in bank provisions in the subsequent period. This might be due to the risky lending 
environment in Africa as managers will have to incrementally increase loan loss provisions in each 
period in anticipation of unexpected losses that may arise which may not be detected by the traditional 
credit risk management tools of African banks. lnLOAN coefficient is negatively significant and is 
robust to alternative estimation, implying that African banks report fewer loan loss provisions during 
periods or increased bank lending (or increase loan supply), providing support to Cavallo and Majnoni 
(2002), Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Hu (2002) who argue that banks that do not 
anticipate credit risks in periods of increased bank lending will keep fewer loan loss provisions due to 
their underestimation of credit risk during good times. Bank size (TA) coefficient is negative and 
weakly significant in Column 3 indicating that bank size have a weak inverse effect on bank 
provisions. Bushman and William (2012) and Leventis et al (2011) also find a negative sign for the 
size variable. The insignificant sign for ln∆GDP indicates that the bank loan loss provision is not 
significantly cyclical with economic boom in the region. 
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Table 2: Analysis of Non-Discretionary Determinants of Provisions and the Economic Cycle 
  OLS (Arellano-Bond) (Arellano-Bover) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
c  -0.004 
(-0.27) 
  
LLPt-1 + 0.271*** 
(3.44) 
0.189*** 
(4.69) 
0.192*** 
(4.90) 
NPL + 0.0004*** 
(4.41) 
0.0006*** 
(4.70) 
0.0004*** 
(3.49) 
lnLOAN +/- -0.0005* 
(-1.80) 
-0.003** 
(-2.58) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.20) 
LOTA + 0.0003*** 
(5.67) 
0.0007*** 
(3.63) 
0.0005*** 
(2.70) 
TA + -0.0004 
(-0.39) 
-0.004 
(-1.51) 
-0.007* 
(-1.90) 
IN∆GDP - -0.0003 
(-0.67) 
-0.0001 
(-0.06) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
     
Adjusted R²  78.30 - - 
F-test  17.84 - - 
Durbin Watson  1.94 - - 
Observations  1196 953 953 
J-statistic  - 33.13 21.10 
P(J-statistic)  - 0.32 0.88 
AR(1)  - 0.000 - 
AR(2)  - 0.324 - 
Regression 1 is based on the method of Bikker and Metzemakers (2005). Regression 2 and 3 are based on Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2008). AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. LLP = loan loss 
provision to total asset ratio for firm i at year t. LLPt-1 = lagged dependent variable. lnLOAN = natural logarithm of change in 
gross loan outstanding. LOTA = net loan to total asset ratio for firm i at time t. NPL = ratio of non-performing loan to gross 
loan for firm i at year t. SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset for firm i at year t. InΔGDP = natural logarithm of real gross 
domestic product growth rate. 
 
  
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 3 report the result for the relationship between bank provisions and low and substantial values 
of its non-discretionary determinants. NPLD coefficient is positively significant in Column 1 
implying that higher (i.e., double-digit or abnormal) NPLs have a positive effect on the level of bank 
provisions. NPLD*NPL coefficient is negatively significant at 5% level, implying that bank 
provisions is a negative function of non-performing loans when African banks have double-digit (or 
high/abnormal) non-performing loans. One possible explanation for this could be that, although banks 
would normally increase loan loss provisions when they expect more NPLs, there is a non-performing 
loan threshold above which African banks will not increase provisions any further possibly to avoid 
eroding net interest margin and/or overall earnings. LG coefficient is positively significant in Column 
2 indicating that increase in bank lending (or loan supply) has a significant positive effect on the level 
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of bank provisions. However, LG*LOAN coefficient is insignificant. LT coefficient is negatively 
significant in Column 3 implying that higher loan-to-asset ratio has a negative effect on the level of 
bank provisions in Africa. LT*LOTA coefficient is positively significant, implying that African banks 
keep higher provisions when they have large loan-to-asset ratio. This result suggests that LOTA is a 
stronger determinant of bank provisions when African banks have large loan-to-asset ratio, and is 
robust to our earlier findings. BG and BG*TA coefficients are insignificant to draw any meaningful 
inference in Column 4. Similarly, BOOM*∆GDP and REC*∆GDP report insignificant signs in 
Column 5 and 6, implying that transient states of the macro economy do not have a significant effect 
on bank provisions in the African region based on the banks and countries examined. One explanation 
for this might be that non-discretionary loan loss provisions are less sensitive to fluctuations in the 
economy compared to discretionary provisions. 
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Table 3: Non-Discretionary Determinants: Interaction Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LLPt-1 0.063 
(1.30) 
0.023 
(0.38) 
0.112* 
(1.93) 
0.129** 
(2.39) 
0.089* 
(1.67) 
0.072 
(1.32) 
NPL 0.001** 
(2.13) 
0.00003 
(0.14) 
0.0002 
(0.73) 
0.0002 
(1.14) 
0.0001 
(0.45) 
0.0001 
(0.28) 
LOTA 0.0009*** 
(4.31) 
0.001*** 
(4.27) 
0.0008*** 
(2.73) 
0.001*** 
(4.14) 
0.0009*** 
(4.62) 
0.001*** 
(5.18) 
LOAN -0.0002*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.0006 
(-1.58) 
-0.0002*** 
(-3.30) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.34) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.32) 
-0.0002*** 
(-2.67) 
TA -0.013*** 
(-3.30) 
-0.017*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.010** 
(-2.59) 
-0.004 
(-0.75) 
-0.009** 
(-2.26) 
-0.017*** 
(-2.67) 
∆GDP -0.0001 
(-0.11) 
-0.00005 
(0.06) 
-0.0002 
(-0.36) 
-0.0001 
(-0.19) 
-0.0007 
(-0.91) 
-0.0003 
(-0.41) 
NPLD 0.007 
(1.23) 
     
NPLD*NPL -0.002** 
(-2.16) 
     
LG  0.012* 
(1.74) 
    
LG*LOAN  0.0003 
(0.72) 
    
LT   -0.128*** 
(-3.33) 
   
LT*LOTA   0.002*** 
(3.42) 
   
BG    -0.085 
(-0.63) 
  
BG*TA    0.005 
(0.45) 
  
BOOM     0.004 
(0.49) 
 
BOOM*∆GDP     0.0001 
(0.09) 
 
REC      -0.008 
(-0.64) 
REC*∆GDP      0.007 
(0.89) 
J-Statistic 23.94 24.51 29.43 
 
28.11 23.70 
 
23.32 
Prob (J-Statistic) 0.68 0.65 0.39 0.46 0.69 0.71 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
AR(2) 0.155 0.018 0.899 0.302 0.444 0.449 
Regression is based on GMM first difference regression based on Arellano and Bond (1991). T-statistic are reported 
in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. LLPt-1 = one-year 
lagged loan loss provision to total asset ratio for firm i at year t-1. LOAN = change in gross loan outstanding. 
LOTA = net loan to total asset ratio for firm i at time t. NPL = ratio of non-performing loan to gross loan for firm i 
at year t. TA = natural logarithm of total asset for firm i at year t. ΔGDP = real gross domestic product growth rate 
at time t. NPLD = dummy variable that takes the value 1 when NPL ratio is a double-digit number and zero 
otherwise. LG = dummy variable that takes the value 1 when loan growth is positive and zero otherwise.  
LT = dummy variable that takes the value 1 when loan-to-asset ratio (LOTA) ratio is above 60% and zero 
otherwise. BG = dummy variable that takes the value 1 when bank total asset is above-the-median natural logarithm 
of total asset ratio and zero otherwise. REC = dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during periods of economic 
downturns, that is, periods with negative ΔGDP growth rate, and zero otherwise. BOOM = dummy variable that 
take the value of 1 for periods of economic prosperity, that is, periods with above-the-median ΔGDP growth rate, 
and zero otherwise.  
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Table 4 report the result for the impact of investor protection on the determinants of bank provisions. 
Of all the interaction terms, only INVPRO*LOAN coefficient is negatively significant indicating that 
higher bank lending is associated with fewer bank provisions in African countries with strong investor 
protection. This implies that the presence of strong investor protection does not mitigate banks’ 
underestimation of loan loss provisions (or expected credit risk) during periods of increased lending. 
INVPRO coefficient reports a positive sign in all regression estimation, implying that strong investor 
protection has a positive effect on the level of loan loss provisions among African banks in the region, 
and this effect is significant in Column 3. 
Table 4: Investor Protection and Non-Discretionary Provisions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LLPt-1 -0.029 
(-0.39) 
-0.027 
(-0.41) 
0.052 
(0.62) 
-0.023 
(-0.33) 
-0.022 
(-0.33) 
NPL -0.00004 
(-0.03) 
0.0006*** 
(2.99) 
0.0008*** 
(2.90) 
0.0006*** 
(2.99) 
0.0006*** 
(2.81) 
LOTA 0.001*** 
(4.29) 
0.001* 
(1.90) 
0.0001*** 
(5.08) 
0.0009*** 
(4.60) 
0.0009*** 
(4.47) 
LOAN -0.0002* 
(-1.84) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.03) 
0.001*** 
(3.56) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.88) 
TA -0.029*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.028*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.022** 
(-2.33) 
-0.028* 
(-1.74) 
-0.028*** 
(-2.83) 
ΔGDP -0.0002 
(-0.31) 
-0.0002 
(-0.25) 
-0.001 
(-1.36) 
-0.0001 
(-0.15) 
0.0006 
(0.23) 
INVPRO 0.009 
(1.04) 
0.010 
(0.98) 
0.021*** 
(2.93) 
0.008 
(0.24) 
0.007 
(1.16) 
INVPRO*NPL 0.0002 
(0.64) 
    
INVPRO*LOTA  -0.00003 
(-0.31) 
   
INVPRO*LOAN   -0.0002*** 
(-4.11) 
  
INVPRO*TA    -0.00005 
(-0.02) 
 
INVPRO*ΔGDP     -0.0001 
(-0.23) 
J-statistic 19.77 18.60 20.81 18.64 18.12 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.87 0.91 0.83 0.90 0.92 
Regression is based on GMM first difference regression based on Arellano and Bond (1991).  
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively. All bank-level variables remain as previously defined. INVPRO 
= minority shareholders right protection. Higher values indicate greater minority shareholders’ 
right protection. 
 
In an additional test, we check whether the behaviour of each non-discretionary provisions 
determinant is influenced by transient economic conditions - economic boom and recession. We 
interact the determinants with the economic boom and recession variables. Table 5 report the results. 
Of all the interaction terms, BOOM*LOAN coefficient is positively significant, implying that higher 
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bank lending is positively associated with higher bank provisions during economic prosperity or 
boom.  
Table 5:  Non-discretionary Provisions Determinant during Transient Economic Conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LLPt-1 0.089 
(1.31) 
0.025 
(0.37) 
0.021 
(0.27) 
-0.021 
(-0.29) 
0.050 
(0.68) 
0.018 
(0.24) 
0.020 
(0.28) 
0.036 
(0.57) 
NPL 0.0004** 
(1.98) 
0.0006*** 
(2.79) 
0.0005** 
(2.21) 
0.0003 
(1.41) 
0.0003 
(1.45) 
0.0005** 
(2.51) 
0.0004** 
(1.98) 
0.0003* 
(1.66) 
LOTA 0.0008*** 
(4.05) 
0.0008*** 
(3.89) 
0.0002*** 
(2.78) 
0.0009*** 
(3.42) 
0.0008*** 
(3.85) 
0.0009*** 
(4.03) 
0.0009*** 
(4.29) 
0.0008*** 
(3.77) 
LOAN -0.0001 
(-1.28) 
-0.0001** 
(-1.98) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.44) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.27) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.82) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.30) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.22) 
-0.0002** 
(-1.99) 
TA -0.021* 
(-1.85) 
-0.028*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.034*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.027** 
(-2.47) 
-0.022* 
(-1.95) 
-0.034*** 
(-3.13) 
-0.0249*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.022** 
(-2.04) 
∆GDP -0.0002 
(-0.22) 
-0.0002 
(-0.82) 
0.00005 
(0.06) 
0.00002 
(0.02) 
0.0003 
(0.33) 
0.0003 
(0.44) 
-0.0002 
(-0.34) 
0.00009 
(0.13) 
REC -0.012 
(-1.15) 
  -0.014 
(-1.18) 
0.004 
(0.46) 
  0.004 
(0.34) 
BOOM  0.007** 
(2.02) 
-0.004 
(-0.70) 
  0.004 
(1.08) 
0.013 
(1.22) 
 
REC*NPL 0.0009 
(1.50) 
       
 
  BOOM*NPL  -0.0002 
(-0.82) 
      
BOOM*LOAN   0.0003** 
(2.52) 
     
REC*LOAN    0.0003 
(1.31) 
    
REC*TA     -0.00001 
(-1.18) 
   
BOOM*TA      0.00003 
(0.69) 
  
BOOM*LOTA       -0.0001 
(-0.71) 
 
REC*LOTA        -0.0001 
(-0.54) 
J-Statistic 19.88 20.43 22.42 19.50 
 
18.49 17.12 20.23 
 
20.56 
Prob (J-Statistic) 0.86 0.84 0.76 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.85 0.84 
Regression is based on GMM first difference regression based on Arellano and Bond (1991). Regression is based on GMM first difference 
regression based on Arellano and Bond (1991). T-statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. All bank-level variables remain as previously defined. ΔGDP = change in real gross domestic product at time t. 
REC = dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for recessionary periods or economic downturns, that is, periods with negative ΔGDP growth 
rate, and zero otherwise. BOOM = dummy variable that take the value of 1 for periods of economic prosperity, that is, periods with above-the-
median ΔGDP growth rate and zero otherwise. 
 
5.4. Country-Specific Analysis 
In order to analyse the differences in the non-discretionary determinants of bank provisions across 
countries and to pinpoint the bias of estimations that do not control for other unobservable country 
differences, we replicate the initial analysis separately for each African country in the sample. To do 
this, we re-estimate the main model and include the real gross domestic product growth rate variable 
to control for economic fluctuation in each African country and to detect whether bank provisions 
exhibit procyclical behaviour in each African country.  
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Table 6 report the results. As can be observed, a positive relationship between NPL and LLP is 
observed for 15 countries (Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroun, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia and Zambia). Of these, the 
relationship between NPL and LLP is only significant for 8 African countries (Algeria, Angola, 
Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania and Togo), implying that non-performing loan is a key 
driver of loan loss provisions for banks in the West African and North African region. The 
relationship between non-discretionary provisions (LLP) and loan growth (LOAN) is negatively 
significant for 4 African countries (Algeria, Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania) and positive but not 
significant for 10 African countries (Angola, Cameroun, Egypt, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia). Also, the relationship between LLP and LOTA is positive for 
13 countries (Algeria, Cameroun, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia) and is significant for banks in Algeria, Cameroun, Ethiopia 
and Nigeria. Furthermore, the link between LLP and ΔGDP is observed to be countercyclical in 3 
African countries (Togo, Namibia and Algeria) and procyclical in Morocco while having a weak link 
for other African countries.  
Overall, the results show that the non-discretionary determinants of bank provisions differ across 
African countries and these differences could be explained by the (i) several unobservable country-
specific differences in the accounting for loan loss provisions in each country, (ii) bank regulator’s 
provisioning guidelines for domestic banks and (iii) specific risk factors in the business environment 
that have a unique impact on the behaviour of loan loss provisions for banks across African countries. 
Also, government interference in bank lending which is common in African countries can also 
influence the behaviour of bank provisions in the region. Government interference in the form of 
guaranteeing bank loans to risky sectors will make banks keep fewer loan loss provisions for highly 
risky assets which could give rise to massive non-performing loans in the event of economic shocks.  
For instance, in South Africa, bank regulators in 2004 require major banks in South Africa to include 
eligible provisions to Tier II capital which include specific provisions, partial write-offs, country risk 
provisions and general provisions; and periodic adjustments to eligible provision would affect the 
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relationship between provisions and NPL, CAR and LOTA. In 2010, a PriceWaterCoopers (2010) 
report states that a significant reduction in bank loan loss provisions contributed to increased 
profitability of the biggest four banks in South Africa (PWC, 2010)
5
, indicating manipulation of 
provisions for earnings management. In Nigeria, bank regulators require banks to provide two 
provisions estimates: IFRS and prudential provisions estimates, and compare the two estimates. If 
prudential provisions estimates are greater than IFRS provisions estimates, the difference is 
transferred from the general reserve account to a non-distributable regulatory reserve account. If 
prudential provision estimates are less than IFRS provisions estimates, the difference is transferred 
from the regulatory reserve account to the general reserve account to the extent of the non-
distributable reserve previously recognized (CBN, 2010), these specific requirements also affects the 
relationship between provisions and NPL, CAR and LOTA
6
.  
In Kenya, the IMF warned that Kenyan banks kept too few provisions because there was government 
guarantee on bank loans to the construction industry. Government guarantee for risky bank lending to 
the construction industry gives rise to significant NPLs for Kenyan banks when losses materialise, and 
the effect of such government guarantee on loans would weaken the expected positive relationship 
between loan loss provisions and non-performing loan.
7
 For Mauritius, in 2014, bank regulators in 
Mauritius require external auditors to submit an opinion to each Mauritian bank on whether their loan 
loss provisions estimates are adequate.
8
 For inclusion in tier 2 capital, banks are required to include 
loan loss provisions (or reserves) for future losses in the determination of Tier 2 capital.
9
 In Uganda, 
bank supervisors require banks to set aside specific provisions regardless of whether a subjective or 
objective criteria was used in determining the classification. In addition to specific provisions, banks 
are required to maintain a general loan loss provision of at least 1% of their total outstanding loan 
                                                          
5
 The big 4 banks are Absa, FirstRand, Nedbank and Standard Bank. PriceWatersCooper (PWC) report is 
available at: https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/major-banks-analysis-march-2011.pdf 
6
 
http://www.cenbank.org/OUT/2010/PUBLICATIONS/BSD/PRUDENTIAL%20GUIDELINES%2030%20JUN
E%202010%20FINAL%20%20_3_.PDF 
7
   http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/IMF-says-Kenyan-banks-exposed-to-bad-loans-danger/-
/539552/2613532/-/apcc8h/-/index.html 
8
 https://www.bom.mu/sites/default/files/Guideline_BaselII.pdf 
9
 https://www.bom.mu/sites/default/files/Guideline_BaselII.pdf 
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facilities net of specific provisions and interest in suspense.
10
 In Namibia, bank regulators in Namibia 
require banks to determine provisions estimate using the IAS 39 and prudential rules measurement 
techniques, and additional specific provisioning should be raised to eliminate any shortfall between 
the two techniques.
11
 In Algeria, public sector lending institutions take a conservative approach in 
provisioning, and tend to be cautious when writing-off NPLs to avoid being perceived as 
‘mismanagement of bank loans’ under the Algerian Criminal Code; therefore, bank managers will be 
overly-cautious in writing off NPLs by increasing provisions
12
. 
Taken together, these issues confirm that the determinants of provisions for African banks are 
influenced by multiple factors other than credit risk factors alone, and these factors (which include 
managerial provisioning decisions, differences in regulatory guidelines on bank provisioning, 
differences in the accounting for bank loan loss provisions across countries in Africa, etc.) underline 
the peculiarity of the banking system in each African country, and should be taken into account when 
investigating bank provisioning practices in Africa. Apart from the seven (7) African countries 
discussed above, information for the bank loan loss provisioning practices for other African countries 
is not publicly available, remotely. 
To sum up, the differences in the determinants of non-discretionary provisions across each country in 
Table 6 highlights the fact that the results obtained from the full sample (see Table 2) only reflect 
average determinants of non-discretionary provisions which vary among banks and across African 
countries. Moving forward, the cross-country result underline the importance of studying country-
specific factors that directly or indirectly influence the level of bank loan loss provisions in any 
regional analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
10
 https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bou-
downloads/acts/supervision_acts_regulations/FI_Regulations/FI_CreditClassificationRegulatns2005.pdf 
11
 https://www.bon.com.na/CMSTemplates/Bon/Files/bon.com.na/1d/1df704cc-a2e7-4764-bc10-
6246f540e187.pdf 
12
 https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/_cr14161.ashx 
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Table 6: County-Specific Regression 
Country β0 LLPt-1 NPL LOAN LOTA TA ΔGDP Adj R² 
Algeria 0.063*** 
(7.21) 
0.045 
(1.10) 
0.0008*** 
(13.31) 
-0.00001*** 
(-3.41) 
0.0003*** 
(4.89) 
-0.006*** 
(-11.25) 
0.002*** 
(6.97) 
98.24 
Angola -0.005 
(-0.17) 
-0.050 
(-0.34) 
0.0006*** 
(2.78) 
0.00007 
(1.53) 
-0.00001 
(-0.09) 
0.0005 
(0.23) 
-0.0002 
(-0.84) 
48.42 
Botswana 0.016 
(1.06) 
0.128 
(0.95) 
0.0002 
(1.16) 
-0.00004* 
(-1.68) 
-0.00004 
(-0.01) 
-0.001 
(-1.05) 
0.00006 
(0.67) 
88.87 
 
Cameroun -0.297* 
(-1.75) 
0.345 
(1.25) 
0.0007 
(1.29) 
0.00005 
(0.47) 
0.0008** 
(2.28) 
0.021* 
(1.63) 
-0.003 
(-1.42) 
80.16 
Egypt -0.096 
(-1.43) 
0.092 
(0.54) 
0.001*** 
(3.44) 
0.00009 
(1.52) 
0.0003 
(1.39) 
0.004 
(1.15) 
0.00005 
(0.01) 
56.31 
 
Ethiopia 0.029 
(0.32) 
-0.701* 
(-1.66) 
-0.0005 
(-0.63) 
-0.0002 
(-1.17) 
0.0006** 
(2.22) 
-0.002 
(-0.39) 
-0.0009 
(-0.68) 
46.37 
Ghana 0.041** 
(2.05) 
0.019 
(0.15) 
-0.00002** 
(-2.17) 
-0.00005 
(-1.26) 
0.00006 
(0.83) 
-0.003** 
(-2.22) 
0.0003 
(1.15) 
23.20 
Kenya 0.009** 
(2.17) 
-0.227* 
(-1.69) 
-0.00002 
(-1.25) 
-0.00001 
(-0.64) 
0.00001 
(0.07) 
-0.0007* 
(-1.92) 
0.00003 
(0.06) 
6.06 
Mauritius 0.012* 
(1.91) 
-0.157 
(-1.12) 
0.00007 
(0.72) 
0.00001 
(0.35) 
0.00004 
(1.16) 
-0.001** 
(-2.23) 
0.0004 
(1.49) 
33.18 
Morocco -0.115** 
(-2.48) 
0.170*** 
(3.25) 
0.0006*** 
(2.90) 
-0.00002 
(-0.46) 
0.00008 
(0.65) 
0.007** 
(2.55) 
-0.0006** 
(-2.25) 
85.70 
Namibia 0.008* 
(1.94) 
0.146 
(0.93) 
0.00002 
(0.28) 
-0.00002* 
(-1.86) 
0.00001 
(0.37) 
-0.0006* 
(-1.74) 
0.0002** 
(2.31) 
33.79 
 
Nigeria 0.180 
(1.41) 
-0.249** 
(-2.25) 
0.002*** 
(3.84) 
0.00001 
(0.05) 
0.0007* 
(1.74) 
-0.012 
(-1.63) 
-0.002 
(-1.42) 
49.87 
Senegal -0.001 
(-0.04) 
0.473*** 
(2.59) 
0.0004 
(0.91) 
0.00009 
(0.98) 
-0.0002 
(-1.23) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
0.00003 
(0.04) 
27.89 
South Africa 0.040 
(1.45) 
0.351*** 
(2.70) 
0.00004 
(0.19) 
0.00008 
(1.52) 
-0.0002 
(-1.51) 
-0.002 
(-1.05) 
-0.0002 
(-0.65) 
44.09 
Tanzania 0.031 
(1.12) 
-0.213 
(-1.38) 
0.001*** 
(3.31) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.39) 
0.0001 
(0.83) 
-0.003 
(-1.11) 
0.0004 
(0.54) 
60.21 
Togo 0.005 
(0.11) 
-0.346*** 
(-2.76) 
0.001*** 
(3.33) 
-0.0001 
(-1.66) 
-0.0002 
(-0.77) 
-0.0009 
(-0.27) 
0.004** 
(2.08) 
64.72 
Tunisia 0.032* 
(1.67) 
0.260*** 
(4.03) 
0.00007 
(1.15) 
0.00009 
(0.90) 
-0.00003 
(-1.11) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.76) 
0.0002 
(1.43) 
52.89 
Uganda 0.006 
(0.46) 
-0.098 
(-0.37) 
-0.00003 
(-0.11) 
0.00001 
(0.58) 
0.00009 
(0.84) 
-0.0008 
(-0.67) 
0.00007 
(0.34) 
1.20 
Zambia 0.086** 
(2.49) 
0.076 
(0.23) 
0.0002 
(1.00) 
0.00003 
(0.45) 
0.00006 
(0.39) 
-0.007*** 
(-2.68) 
0.0002 
(0.11) 
3.24 
Note: OLS regression with bank fixed effects and robust standard error correction is applied. 
 
5.5. Further Robustness Checks 
One, we address concerns that differences in the level of financial sector development may affect our 
result. Some African countries have a well-developed financial sector than other African countries 
and these differences may impact the non-discretionary determinants of bank provisions in the region. 
We divided the full sample into two country subsample: financially-developed African countries 
(which are Mauritius, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya) and less financially-developed African 
countries (consisting of the remaining African countries). The result is reported in Table 7 and show 
that bank lending (lnLOAN) remain a key driver of non-discretionary provisions across all 
estimations in the two subsample while bank size is positively associated with non-discretionary 
provisions for banks in financially-developed African countries. The coefficient of the remaining 
variables report mixed signs. 
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Two, for the main result we remove the natural logarithm of GDP growth rate (lnΔGDP) and loan 
growth (lnLOAN) and replace it with the absolute values of both variables (ΔGDP and LOAN) and 
re-estimate Equation 1. The results remain the same with NPL, LOAN and LOTA coefficients 
remaining significant; hence, we excluded the analysis but retained the results in Table 2 because it is 
similar to the method of Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008, 2012). Finally, as an alternative proxy for 
economic prosperity, we use a dummy variable that equal one if GDP growth rate is a non-negative 
number rather than above-the-median GDP and the results remain the same. 
 
Table 7: Further Robustness Checks  
More Financially Developed vs Less Financially Developed African countries 
 
 (A) 
More Financially Developed African Countries 
(B) 
Less Financially Developed African countries 
 Fixed Effect 
OLS 
GMM (Arellano-
Bond) 
GMM 
(Arellano-
Bover) 
Fixed Effect 
OLS 
GMM (Arellano-Bond) GMM (Arellano-Bover) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 0.032 
(1.57) 
  0.036 
(1.47) 
  
LLPt-1 0.259** 
(2.08) 
-0.193*** 
(-3.53) 
0.012 
(0.22) 
0.024 
(0.03) 
0.203*** 
(5.39) 
0.219*** 
(4.79) 
NPL 0.0005*** 
(3.54) 
0.0005** 
(2.11) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.63) 
0.0005*** 
(3.38) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.71) 
lnLOAN 0.016*** 
(4.89) 
0.082*** 
(8.80) 
0.106*** 
(18.38) 
0.032*** 
(3.93) 
0.048*** 
(4.05) 
0.032** 
(2.12) 
LOTA 0.00004*** 
(8.46) 
0.0003 
(0.56) 
0.00001 
(0.32) 
-0.0006*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.001** 
(-2.55) 
-0.0007 
(-1.33) 
TA -0.017*** 
(-4.67) 
-0.119*** 
(-12.39) 
-0.144*** 
(-19.10) 
-0.030*** 
(-3.68) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.018* 
(-1.66) 
IN∆GDP 0.0002 
(0.97) 
-0.0005 
(-0.82) 
-0.0004 
(-0.78) 
-0.0002 
(-1.40) 
0.0001 
(0.25) 
0.00003 
(0.12) 
       
Adjusted R² 86.18 - - 40.88   
F-test 35.11 - - 4.48   
Durbin Watson 1.82 - - 1.84   
Observations 515 434 953 903 737 737 
J-statistic - 25.27 29.58 - 32.00 34.44 
P(J-statistic) - 0.71 0.49 - 0.36 0.26 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. LLP = loan loss provision to total asset ratio for firm i at year 
t. LLPt-1 = lagged dependent variable. lnLOAN = natural logarithm of change in gross loan outstanding. LOTA = net loan to total asset ratio for firm i at time t. NPL = ratio of non-
performing loan to gross loan for firm i at year t. SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset for firm i at year t. InΔGDP = natural logarithm of real gross domestic product growth rate. 
The regression in (A) performed by pooling together all banks in financially developed African countries which include Mauritius, Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria, while the 
regression in (B) is done by pooling together all other banks except banks in Mauritius, Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria. 
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6. Conclusion 
This study investigate the non-discretionary determinants of bank loan loss provisions in Africa. 
Using a sample of banks from 19 African countries, the findings indicate that non-performing loans, 
loan-to-asset ratio and loan growth are significant non-discretionary determinants of bank loan loss 
provisions in the African region. Additionally, the findings show that increase in loan loss provision is 
a positive function of non-performing loans up to a threshold beyond which loan loss provisions will 
no longer increase as non-performing loans increases. Also, bank loan-to-asset ratio is observed to be 
a more significant driver of bank loan loss provisions when banks have higher loan-to-asset ratios. 
More so, we observe that increase in bank lending leads to fewer loan loss provisions in African 
countries with strong investor protection while higher bank lending is associated with higher bank 
provisions during economic boom. Furthermore, the study reveals that country-specific differences 
matter in explaining the non-discretionary determinants of bank loan loss provisions. To sum up, apart 
from the relevance of using theoretical non-discretionary determinants of bank provisions, this paper 
highlights the relevance of minority shareholder rights protection, fluctuating economic conditions 
and national characteristics (both observable and unobservable non-discretionary factors) that may 
influence the level of bank loan loss provisions in the African region. 
The policy implication of the study is that bank loan loss provision in Africa is not procyclical with 
fluctuating economic conditions, therefore, bank supervisors in African countries should encourage 
banks to adopt a forward-looking provisioning system in anticipation of bad times while ensuring that 
bank managers comply with existing institutional constraints aimed at protecting investors.  
For the purpose of policy evaluation, if one goal of national bank supervisors in the African region is 
to ensure that bank loan loss provisioning is driven by its non-discretionary determinants (as opposed 
to its discretionary determinants), then the findings in this paper show that this goal has been 
achieved. We recommend that national bank supervisors in the African region should increase their 
surveillance of the loan loss provisioning practices of banks across African countries to ensure that 
each African bank has sufficient loan loss provisions to act as buffers to mitigate the mounting non-
performing loan problems in the banking sector in several African countries. Also, there is the need to 
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improve the level of investor protection in the region which could provide additional monitoring and 
discipline on the way bank mangers influence (or manipulate) loan loss provision estimates.  
One limitation of the study is that we do not examine all the unique factors affecting loan loss 
provision for banks in each African country. Another limitation is that we do not examine the link 
between loan loss provisions and other macroeconomic factor such as inflation, exchange rate, etc.  
Going forward, the implication of our study for future research is the need to provide additional 
insight on the link between bank loan loss provisions and other macroeconomic indicators. We 
focused on the link between loan loss provisions and changes in GDP as a proxy for macroeconomic 
fluctuation. Future research could analyse how loan loss provisions relate to other macroeconomic 
indicators in the African region such as unemployment, inflation, etc.  
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Appendix 
 
 
A1: Correlation Matrix 
 LLP LOAN LOTA TA ΔGDP INVPRO LG LT BIG NPLD BOOM REC 
LLP  1.000  0.041  0.060 -0.031 -0.079  0.194 -0.062  0.046 -0.068  0.307 -0.076  0.076 
LOAN  0.041  1.000  0.019 -0.179  0.294 -0.001  0.494 -0.053 -0.147 -0.161  0.251 -0.092 
LOTA  0.060  0.018  1.000  0.012 -0.208  0.062  0.225  0.799  0.012 -0.096 -0.134  0.055 
TA -0.031 -0.179  0.012  1.000 -0.199  0.238 -0.011  0.095  0.759 -0.157 -0.227  0.072 
ΔGDP -0.079  0.294 -0.208 -0.199  1.000 -0.214  0.080 -0.208 -0.113 -0.043  0.704 -0.341 
INVPRO  0.195 -0.001  0.062  0.238 -0.214  1.000 -0.007  0.124  0.073 -0.081 -0.129  0.207 
LG -0.063  0.494  0.226 -0.011  0.080 -0.007  1.000  0.131 -0.014 -0.146  0.080 -0.085 
LT  0.046 -0.053  0.799  0.095 -0.208  0.123  0.131  1.000  0.071 -0.049 -0.165  0.054 
BIG -0.068 -0.147  0.012  0.759 -0.113  0.073 -0.014  0.071  1.000 -0.142 -0.153  0.001 
NPLD  0.307 -0.160 -0.095 -0.157 -0.043 -0.080 -0.146 -0.049 -0.142  1.000 -0.016  0.022 
BOOM -0.076  0.250 -0.134 -0.226  0.704 -0.129  0.080 -0.165 -0.154 -0.016  1.000 -0.155 
REC  0.076 -0.092  0.056  0.073 -0.340  0.208 -0.086  0.054  0.001  0.021 -0.155  1.000 
 
 
 
A2: Data Source 
Indicator Source 
Loan Loss Provision (LLP) Bankscope Database 
Net loan to total asset (LOTA) Bankscope Database 
Real Gross Domestic Product (ΔGDP) World Economic Forum archived in World Bank database 
Total asset (TA) Bankscope Database 
Loan growth (LOAN) Bankscope Database 
Non-performing loan (NPL) Bankscope Database 
Minority Shareholder Right Protection (INVPRO) Doing Business Indicator in the World Bank database 
 
